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Abstract
Model checking analysis can improve the correctness of tabular software specification.
Software Specification defines what the system does. This documentation used in each
stage of software engineering. The design of the software will base on what software
specification  state.  Code  development  and  test  evaluate  according  to  the  software
specification.  These  usages  show  the  importance  of  software  specification.  The
correctness of the specification can affect the quality of the software directly. Formal
method has been introduced to improve the correctness of the software specification. But,
the requirement of most of the formal method technique requires mathematical training or
theorem proving skills  becomes  the  barrier  towards  practical  use.  Tabular  notation  is
introduced to break this barrier. It tries to abstract the property of what the system does
rather  than  formalize  all  the  information.  This  notation  requires  less  mathematical
training or theorem proving skills, but the power of formality decrease. SCR (Software
Cost Reduction) is a tabular notation, which have a tool call SCRTool. This tool has a
feature called verifier, which allow the tabular specification covert to formal specification
for  spin  to  check  safety  critical  and  liveness  property.  Thus,  the  power  of  formality
maintained and practical usability increased. In this project, a case study for a two-floor
elevator is used to try out this feature.
1. Introduction
SCR  (Software  Cost  Reduction)  is  a  formal  notion  that  uses  to  specify  event-driven
systems. It was originally developed from Naval Research Lab (NRL) researchers  for
document  the  requirements  of  the  operational  flight  program  of  the  US  Navy’s  A-7
aircraft  [1].  A  wide  range  of  practical  systems  uses  the  SCR  notation  to  specify  the
requirements  afterward.  These  systems  mainly  use  the  notation  to  specify  functional
properties of the system. It also has been used in other systems such as security, safety,
real-time,  and  fault-tolerance  [2].  SCR  notation  describes  the  system  as  a  black  box,
which only show what the system do, without the detail of how the system built. The
specification generate by SCR notation can be used to describe the required behavior of a
system or component of the system precisely. Any hardware or software can be built by
following  the  specification.  (The  specification  can  be  use  to  build  any  hardware  or
software system.)
SCR used state machine idea to specify the state of the system, where a state represents
the  situation  of  the  software  or  system  and  transactions  between  different  states  are
trigger by events. But, SCR calls them a little different. A state is called a mode and eventidentifies as change of state of a variable. For example, button, a boolean variable that
represent a on/off light switch, change from false to true is a event. A transition table is
used to store these information.
Four Variable Model has adapted by SCR for specifying the required system behavior.
The input and output interaction of the system formalized using monitor variable as input
from  environment,  control  variable  as  output  to  control  the  environment,  and  term
variable for internal control. These variables relate to each other using different tables,
such  as  condition  table,  event  table.  Further  analysis,  such  as  consistence  and
completeness check, can be perform with the specification
Naval Research Lab developed SCRTool to support SCR notation and provide different
tools to analysis the specification. Specification Editor used to view and edit specification
that  use  SCR  notation.  Different  analysis  tools,  such  as  type  check,  syntax  check,
consistent check, etc, can run from CC Checker to analysis the specification. Dependency
Graph Browser will show the dependency relationship between different variables and
modes. Simulator provides features for setting up and running simulation with different
scenario to verify the specification. But, evaluate by running simulation is not confidence
enough.  Model  checking  can  be  use  in  the  next  step  to  increase  the  confidence  of
correctness.  A  feature  call  Verifier  within  SCRTool  can  translate  SCR  notation  to
Promela such that it can be run on SPIN. In this project, a two-floor elevator will be
model using SCR notation and using Verifier in SCRTool to convert it to Promela. Then,
XSPIN is used to verify different safety critical and liveness properties. More detail about
SCR and SCR notation will be explain in section 2. And, the case study will be shown in
section 3.
2. Software Cost Reduction (SCR)
2.1 Parnas Four Variable Model
Four Variable Model  is one of the  main  formal  frameworks for  SCR  notation  [3]. It
describes  the  required  system  behavior  as  a  set  of  logical  relations  on  four  sets  of
variables. The four sets of variables are monitored and controlled variable and input and
out data items. Monitor variables are quantities in the environment that influence system
behavior. On the other hand, Controlled variable are quantities in the environment that
the system control. Input data items represent the values that the input device read. And,
Output data items represent the values that write to output device. For example, in the
case  study,  the  sensor  that  monitors  the  elevator  door  is  a  monitor  variable  and  the
mechanism that control the elevator door to be open or close is a controlled variable. The
value open and close are input and output data items.
A set of relations is used to link between these four sets of variables. NAT and REQ are
two relations describe on monitored and control quantities. NAT describes the constraints
imposed by physical laws and system environment. REQ describes the relation between
the monitored and controlled quantities that the system must enforce to produce required
behavior. IN relation describe the mapping between the monitored quantities to the inputdata  items.  And,  OUT  relation  describe  the  mapping  between  the  data  items  to  the
controlled  quantities.  More  information  about  Four  Variable  Model  can  be  found  in
Parnas Four Variable Model [4].
2.2 SCR Notation
To apply Four Variable Model practically and concisely, SCR introduced mode classes,
terms, conditions, and events. A mode classes is like a state machine, whose values are
modes. Each mode is a system mode, which represents the current state of the entire
system. In complex systems, several modes classes can be define in SCR such that they
can operate in parallel. A term is an internal variable that used in the computation. A
condition  is a predicate defined  on  one  or  more  state  variable,  such  as  monitored or
controlled  variable,  mode  class  or  term,  at  some  point  in  time.  For  example,  when
elevator is on floor one and the door is open, the condition of ready is true. SCR show
this condition as “ efloor = 1 and edoor = open”. An event occur when state variable
change its value. For example, Floor one button change from off to on is an event. There
are different types of event define in SCR. A primitive event is a change in state variable.
If the state variable happen to be a monitor variable, it will become an input event. A
condition event is a primitive event, which occurs only when the condition is satisfied. In
SCR, event denoted by the notation “@T”, “@F”, and “@C”. “@T(variable)” means the
variable  will  become  true  in  the  next  state.  “@F(variable)”  means  the  variable  will
become false in the next state and “@C(variable)” means the variable will change value
in the next state. A more formal definition of primitive event is “@T( a ) = not a and a”
and conditional event is “@T( a ) WHEN b = not a and a and b”. A floor one button
becomes  true  only  when  a  person  present  “@T(fb1)  WHEN  person  =  true”  is  a
conditional event example.
The functionality of the system can be defined by expressing the values of controlled
variables as a function that take monitored variables as input, and used mode classes and
terms for computation. The question “how all variables, mode classes, terms, conditions
and events be link together” still needed to answer to complete the REQ relation between
monitored and controlled variable. SCR solving this question by using tables. A SCR
specification  consists  of  a  set  of  directories  and  a  set  of  tables  defining  the  system
behavior. Firstly, variables will be define in one of the directories. A directory defines
what the variables are and each type of variable  has  its own directory, such  as  type,
constant, variable and mode class directory. Each variable belongs to only one directory.
After  define  the  variables  in  the  directories,  each  class  mode,  term,  and  controlled
variable  need  to  setup  its  own  table.  A  mode  transition  table  is  used  to  specify  the
transition between states in a mode class. Transitions between the states have to trigger
by events. Without any event, the system will not change its states. This is very similar to
start a car. The driver has to turn the key (an event) before the engine start (idle mode to
ready  mode).  In  each  transition,  the  mode  transition  table  requires  original  and
destination mode and the event to specify a full transition. And, all transitions in the table
have to be deterministic. The value of each term and controlled variable can be specify on
either condition table or event table.A condition table defines all possible values of a variable. When a transition happens, the
value of the variable will change according to the condition table. Thus, the condition
table  has  to  include  all  the  possible  value  of  the  variable  in  different  condition.  The
condition table can be specify into mode or modeless table. A mode condition table, rows
represent modes and columns represent the possible values of the variable. Each cell is a
condition for a particular  mode. When the condition  is true in a particular  mode, the
value,  which  locates  at  the  bottom  of  the  same  column,  is  selected.  In  a  modeless
condition table, the layout is the same as mode condition table except mode is not exist in
modeless condition table. Each condition is a global condition. As soon as the condition
is true, the value will be selected regardless which mode the system  is  in. No matter
which type of condition type is used. Completeness of the table has to fulfil.
An event table is a little different. It describes the change of value of the variable by
event. The value of the variable will not change its value even the condition is true. The
variable only changes its value when events that specify in the event table happens. The
selected value represents the value for next state not the current state. There are mode and
modeless  event  table  as  well.  The  format  of  mode  event  table  and  condition  table
basically  is  the  same.  The  only  difference  is  the  cell.  In  mode  event  table,  a  cell
represents a event expression instead. Modeless event table and modeless condition table
has the same difference as well. Event table is not as strict as condition. Specify all value
of the variable is not necessary. It only requires to specify events that cause it to change
value. But, both of the tables have to be disjoint. Otherwise, the specification will become
non-deterministic.
Environment assumption is the last topic that is going to discuss about SCR notation. It is
similar to the NAT relation from four variable model that discussed in pervious section.
These assumptions are constraints from the environment that will hold in all states. For
example, the elevator can only be locate in either floor one or floor two. It can not be
locate  in different floor at the same time. In SCR notation, this  kind  of  environment
assumptions can be specify in environment assertion directory. More detail examples of
the variables, table, mode class that just discuss can be found in the elevator case study in
section 3.
2.3 More about SCRTool
As pervious section mention, SCRTool is a tool that developed by NRL to support SCR
notation. It general feature has been introduced in introduction section. In this section,
Verification feature of SCRTool is the focus. Since, this is the motivation of this case
study. SCRTool provide different features for analysis the specification. Different checks,
such as syntax, type, disjointness, names and variables checks, etc, can be perform from
CC Checker, one of the main component of SCRTool. These checks will help to catch
error in describing the specification in SCR notation. This is only the static property of
the specification. The dynamic property of the specification has not been check yet. In
this case study, two analysis tool has been use to check the dynamic property of the
specification. They are Simulator in SCRTool and XSPIN model checker. These are two
different type of analysis tool.Simulator is a tool  within  SCRTool  that  capable  to  setup,  edit,  and  view  simulation.
Simulation  is  a  property-based  analysis.  It  is  able  to  detect  errors  in  property-based
specification, which describe the required system properties. Different scenarios are run
within the simulation to verify the required system properties has been specify correctly.
And, XSPIN is a model checker that can verify properties of the specification, too. It is an
operational (model-based) tool, which exams every state of the specification. This is a
stronger verification than simulation. If the specification can pass in both tests, it is pretty
confidence to say the properties satisfy. But, these tests require different specification,
property and operational based.
SCR used a dual-language approach [9], which allows a specification covert between
property and operational based specification. SCRTool has a component called Verifier.
It can convert a SCR specification into Promela with out losing any semantic or logical
information. This feature allows the same specification to be test and verify with two
analysis techniques. A better specification will able to generate. The case study in section
3 will show how this process can be done.
3. Case Study: elevator model
In this case study, a simple two-floor elevator is going to be model. The model has to
make sure the following properties satisfy.
1)  If there is a request to a particular floor, the elevator will eventually service it.
2)  Elevator never moves with its door open.
The  first  step  to  achieve  these  goals  is  to  specify  the  system  precisely  using  SCR
notation. Then, apply the check features in CC Checker to make sure the static property
of the specification is correct. Dynamic property of the specification will be check next
by simulate the system behavior using Simulator follow by verify the system properties
using XSPIN model checker.
3.1 The SCR specification
In  this  elevator  model,  nine  variables  and  one  mode  class  have  been  used.  In  nine
variables, there are five monitored variables, two terms, and two controlled  variables.
These variables generate by the following four steps:
1)  Identify and describe the controlled variables.
2)  Identify and describe the monitored variables.
3)  Identify and describe the mode classes.
4)  Specify the relation between monitored and controlled variable.
3.1.1 Identify controlled variables
Controlled variables are environment quantities that the elevator can control. Elevators
usually able to control which floor they locate and open or close the elevator door. These
controllable environment quantities represent by cDoor and cFloor. They are  listed  inFigure 1 along with their types, initial values and descriptions. cDoor is used to specify
the elevator door is going to open or close. It is assigned to yDoor type. All the types are
listed in Figure 2. yDoor type is a user define type which has value open or close only.
Thus, cDoor can indicate the elevator controller is going to close or open the door. cFloor
is used to specify which floor the elevator are moving to. It is assigned to yFloor user
define type. Look at yFloor type. It is a range of Integer from zero to one. This range is
expandable depend how many floor the elevator support. One of the reasons why yFloor
type  is  introduced rather  than  using  Integer type  is  because  of  the  expandability  just
mention. Another reason is the retune cause by the translation  from  SCR  notation  to
Promela.  This problem can refer to section 3.4 for more detail. Variables, cFloor and
cDoor, are part of the environment, but, they are controlled by the system.
Figure 1: Variable Directory for elevator model
Figure 2: Type Directory for elevator model
3.1.2 Identify monitored variables
The environment quantities that the system monitors are going to be identify next. The
key to select monitor variables is to think them as the input of the system. Imagine thehuman skin. It monitors the environment temperate all the time. Human brain will take
this information as input and react to it by contract the holes on the skin if the temperate
is low. Thus, The system will monitor the change of these variables and react according
to  the  specification.  Elevator  needs  information  about  the  current  status  of  its  door,
location,  and  service  request  to  determine  what  to  do.  These  concepts  captured  by
monitor variables, mRequest0, mRequest1, mFloor, mDoor, and time. They are listed in
Figure  1.  mRequest0  and  mRequest1  monitor  elevator’s  button.  If  the  button,  which
request elevator to floor zero, is on, mRequest0 will be true. Same situation happen in
mRequest1. They provide service request information to the elevator. mDoor is used to
monitor the status of the elevator door and mFloor is used to monitor which floor the
elevate  locate.  At  last,  the  monitor  variable,  time,  represent  the  time  click  that  is
happening in the real world.
3.1.3 Identify mode classes
Now,  the  input  and  output  of  the  elevator  system  has  been  identified.  The  general
framework of the elevator is done. The internal specification of the system is going to
start  from  identifying  mode  classes.  This  is  the  engine  of  the  elevator  controller.  As
section 2 mention, a mode class is very similar to a state machine. Thus, the design of the
state  machine  for  the  elevator  controller  is  the  starting  point  at this  stage.  When  the
design is done, it can translate into mode class directory and mode transition table. A
state in the machine will become a mode in SCR and a transition will record as event
expression in SCR. Then, summarize all the mode information into mode class directory
and all the transition information into mode transition table. The mode class directory of
the elevator model is shown in Figure 3 and mode transition table is shown in Figure 4.
Terms may introduce in this stage, too.
The elevator model used one mode class only. As a reminder, SCR allow more than one
mode class run in parallel. Status is the name of the mode class and modes are other
possible  states  in  the  state  machine.  The  initial  state  of  this  machine  is  Idle0.  The
transitions between these modes are specified in the mode transition table. In the first row
of mode transition table, it shows the transition move from Idle0 mode to EClose0 mode
when request to floor one event occur or at timeout request to floor one was requested.
More detail about the model can be found in Figure 3 and 4.
 
Figure 3: Mode Class Directory for elevator modelFigure 4: Mode Transition Table for elevator model
3.1.4 Specify the REQ relation
After the mode class is designed. The link between monitored variable and controlled
variable still need to establish. They are going to linked by condition table and event
table. Each controlled variable and terms require one condition or event table  for the
specification to be complete. Sometime the decision to choose the type of table  for a
particular controlled variable or term could be hard. A very clear understanding about the
model that is modeling and SCR notation may require. Two condition table and two event
table has been used in the elevator specification. Controlled variables, cFloor and cDoor,
are  specified  using  control  table.  And,  terms,  tRequest0  and  tRequest1,  are  specified
using  event table.  tRequest0  and  tRequest1  choose  to  use  event table  because  of  the
natural dependent property of these variable. The computation of these variables depend
on  monitored  variables,  mRequest0  and  mRequest1,  who  is  the  event  trigger  the
transition  of  state.  cFloor  and  cDoor  choose  condition  table  because  their  result  are
depend on which mode they are in. Thus, condition table is the best fit. See Figure 5 and
6 for some example.
Figure 5: Event Table for tReques0Figure 6: Condition Table for cDoor
3.1.5 Specify the environment assumptions
The elevator specification hasn’t complete yet. To complete the elevator specification,
addition  of  environment  assumptions,  the  NAT  relation,  is  require.  The  environment
assumptions are constraints or physical laws in the environment. In the elevator model, a
couple  of  simple  assumptions  have  applied.  The  assumption  of  the  next  state  of
monitored  variable,  mDoor,  is  equal  to  the  controlled  variable,  cDoor,  is  the  first
assumption. This assumption is shown as “mDoor’ = cDoor” in environment assertion
directory on Figure 7. The symbol ‘ means the next state in SCR. The logic behind this
assumption is the natural relation of the elevator controller and the elevator door. Usually,
the  elevator  controller  commands  the  elevator  door to  close.  Then,  the  elevator  door
control itself to close the door. There must be some input to the sensor telling the elevator
controller that the door is already close. If this relation is invalid, the elevator must have a
hardware failure.
Figure 7: Environmental Assertion DirectoryThe second assumption has the similar reason. There must be an  input to the sensor,
mFloor, from the controller, cFloor, to tell the elevator controller that the elevator arrived
certain floor. The last assumption is from the physical design of a button. When a button
is push, a signal is generated. Then, the human hand leaves the button. The button will
pop up automatically without generate any meaningful signal. Since, there is no unset
feature  to  floor  request  button  usually.  But,  SCR  requires  to  consider  both  cases
separately. To guarantee this natural relation exist. Thus, the third assumption is added.
At  this  stage,  the  initial  elevator  specification  is  completed.  The  full  SCR  elevator
specification locates in appendix A.
3.2 CC Checker Analysis
CC Checker can improve the correctness of the initial elevator specification by providing
different checks. Some of the errors found by the CC checker are easy to solve, such as
syntax error or unique name error. The next level of errors  is  logical  errors,  such  as
coverage  and  consistency  errors.  They  are  a  little  harder  to  solve.  In  the  process  of
finding the solution, review the  logics  in the specification demand a  lot of work and
thinking. Sometime, the solution may only affect one variable. But, indeed most of time,
the solution involves changes in a couple of variables. The hardest errors found from CC
Checker are dependency errors. The cause of this error is  form the cycle dependency
relationship between variables and mode classes. One of the example from this elevator
case study is the design of serial event generate from one external event. Some serial
internal events from the elevator controller want to trigger from a floor request event. CC
Checker found cycle dependency between a variable and the mode class. Errors like these
are hard to find solution sometime. In worst case, the solution may require to change a
large portion in the specification. The Dependency Graph Browser in SCRTool will able
to help analyzing this problem by showing a dependency graph for all variables and mode
class. See Figure 8. The static analysis of the elevator specification is done.
Figure 8: Dependency Graph3.3 Running simulation
Next, the dynamic behavior of the specification is going to be check. Simulation is going
to test the elevator specification first. Then. Model Checker is going to be use in the next
section to verify some properties of the specification. In this test, some typical and special
scenario has been planned to challenge the behavior of the elevator specification. One of
the typical scenarios is the elevator at floor zero waiting for request and floor request to
another  floor or  same  floor  event  happen.  This  scenario  can  test the  behavior  of  the
elevator in a normal situation. One of the special scenarios setup a floor zero request
event  when  the  elevator  is  in  the  process  servicing  floor  one  request.  The  special
scenarios are quite helpful. It found some  design  errors  in  the  mode  class  where  the
elevator stuck on floor one after it serviced floor one request rather than carry on the
service queue to serve floor zero request. Another problem found from the simulation is
the button push and pop situation. It is fixed by add an environment assertion.
3.4 Verify the elevator specification with XSPIN
The  last test in this  case  study  used  XSPIN  Model  Checker  to  verify  the  validity  of
described properties. Although a lot of thought test has been ran on the initial elevator
specification already, but these testes are not able to test all case. Test the specification
using model checker allow all possible case to be tested such that the achievement of
required properties can be confirm confidently.
Verifier, one of the components of SCRTool, converts the elevator specification  from
SCR notation to Promela. This tool covert most of the specification correctly. But, some
modification to the Promela still required before verifying the properties. The modified
Promela can be found in Appendix B. There are couple main modifications. Environment
assertion (NAT relation) has not covert into Promela. They have to add manually. Pick
one of the environment assertions as an example. Monitored variable, mDoor, next state
value  should  equal  to  the  value  of  controlled  variable,  cDoor.  The  statement
“mDoor_NEW = cDoor_NEW” is added to conserve the assertion. Another environment
assertion  has  been  indirectly  converted  because  of  the  design  of  value  picking  for
monitored variables, which can be found in the guard of selecting value of monitored
variables, mRequest0 and mRequest1.
The second main modification found in converting integer. Verifier covert any integer
type  variables  into a very  large test range. This problem causes the cases that model
checker need to check grow rapidly. The XSPIN verify results are out of memory. This
problem  happened  in  two  areas  in  this  case  study.  The  first  problem  found  in  the
variables, mFloor and cFloor. It has been solve by adding a user define type, yFloor, to
limit the range of an integer. The same situation found in the monitored variable, time. It
has been solve using similar technique. The time variable only has two acceptable values,
0  and  1, to represent the  time  change.  The  test  results  show  this  solution  successful
removed a large number of states.Another  problem  area  is  in  the  event  generation  section.  Verifier  will  convert  all
monitored variable into the event generate section. The convertion ignore the information
from the assertion specify. For example, the monitored variable, mDoor, and controlled
variable, cDoor, problem that mention previously. The value mDoor should come from
cDoor. So, these events do not necessary require to generate. This causes a lot of work in
debugging the counter example. Another problem found in this area is the fairness of
generating  possible  value  for  monitored  variables.  Thus,  the  event  generation  section
needs to be analysis carefully. There is no systematic way to check these errors. These
errors really depend on the case. A good understanding in XSPIN may require solving
these problems.
Although  a  lot  of  Promela  modification  may  need  in  the  translation.  But  the  model
checker verification process has successfully found some missing mistake. For example,
when verifying the first property, “If there is a request to a particular floor, the elevator
will  eventually  service  it”,  there  are  couple  errors  found  that  has  not  been  detected
before. The result show a weakness in the event tables of tRequest0 and tRequest1, where
they may change to true even the request is in the same floor that the elevate locate. This
problem causes some logical problem on resetting them back to false. Another problem
found by the model checker is very similar to the one that found by simulation in the
special scenario. The elevator stuck on floor one after serving floor one request and it is
not capable to server the floor zero request. Different approaches have been tried, such as
record pervious history and generate internal event. Unlucky these approach  have  not
successful  solve  the  problem.  Thus,  time  is  introduced  as  a  solution.  It  bypass  the
problem with the system define  method  “DURATION(expression)”, which record the
time for the expression specify in the parameter. This is not the best way to solve this
problem. Serial event should be a better solution for this kind of problem, where a event
can easily invoke another event. RSML, a tabular notation, provide some support in this
idea [22].
After all these thought testes, the final specification is very confident to announce the
required properties has been achieve. The detail about the properties test and the result
can be found in Appendix B.
4. Discussions and Conclusions
This elevator case study successfully shown the approach is practically possible. The use
of  tabular  SCR  notation  require  less  mathematic  and  theorem  proving  training  and
maintain  correctness  level  using  model  checking  technique.  The  SCR  elevator
specification provides a clear understanding of what the system is and the result from
model checking support the elevator satisfy the required properties. But, there are some
concerns need to notice in this approach.
In the process of designing the initial specification, it is easily overstate or understate the
initial  specification.  For  example,  in  the  case  study,  the  first  initial  specification  has
controlled variables, dOpen, dClose, up and down. It was overstated because it is not
necessary need to specify each possible elevator action as a Boolean variable. The actionscan  easily  simply  into  two  controlled  variables,  cFloor  and  cDoor.  The  original
specification  has  nothing  wrong.  But,  a  complicated  specification  may  generate.  This
could cause difficulty in analyzing and specifying REQ relation.
The skill level requirement for mathematical and theorem proving may decrease in the
initial  specification.  But,  eventually  the  require  skill  level  become  the  same.  The
translation from SCR notation to Promela requires a good understanding in Promela. To
learn Promela, advance mathematical and theorem proving training is require. Thus, it is
not necessary decreasing the require skill overall.
The simplicity of SCR notation allows it to specify large system. On the other hand, there
is a limitation from model checking. The number of possible state needs to test by model
checker increase rapidly for large system. Without the model checker, simulation in SCR
is not strong enough to test properties. This dependency relationship may limit the use of
this technique in a system that is not too big.
The  elevator  case  study  brings  out  some  limitation  of  SCR  notation.  One  of  the
limitations of SCR notation is the expressiveness. SCR does not support parallel event. In
the  elevator  case  study,  floor  request  and  time  click  are  parallel  events.  The  natural
relationship is lost during the specification process. Another helpful support is the use of
serial events. SCR seems a little weak in this use. Difficult situation have been found in
setting up serial event in the elevator case study. More support on these concepts and
pervious points may improve the popularity of use of this technique.Appendix A: Full SCR two-floors elevator model
Table 1: Contents of the Specification
Table 2: Type DirectoryTable 3: Variable Directory
Table 4: Mode Transition TableTable 5: Mode Class Directory
Table 6: Event Table for tRequest0Table 7: Event Table for tRequest1
Table 8: Condition Table for cDoorTable 9: Condition Table for cFloor
Table 10: Environment Assertion DirectoryAppendix B:
Modified Promela elevator model and test result from XSPIN
Promela:
/* This file contains the PROMELA/spin version of an SCRTool
specification. */
/* It is created by SCRTool and automatically fed to Xspin. */
/* However, this file was left in the file elevator7.ssl.spin */
/* for you to use, look at, etc. */
/* When executed, the program outputs a line begining with ’MVC ’ */
/* (monitored variable change) each time a monitored variable is */
/* updated, indicating the name of that variable and its new value. */
/*****************************/
/*     numeric constants     */
/*****************************/
#define TRUE 1
#define FALSE 0
#define Idle0 0
#define EClose0 1
#define EMove0 2
#define EOpen0 3
#define Idle1 4
#define EClose1 5
#define EMove1 6
#define EOpen1 7
#define OPEN 0
#define CLOSE 1
#define WTime 0
/*********************************/
/*     variable declarations     */
/*********************************/
int _DUR_tRequest0_E_OLD = 0;
int _DUR_tRequest0_E_NEW = 0;
int _DUR_tRequest1_E_OLD = 0;
int _DUR_tRequest1_E_NEW = 0;
byte cDoor_NEW = OPEN;
int cFloor_NEW = 0;
byte mDoor_OLD = OPEN;
byte mDoor_NEW = OPEN;
int mFloor_OLD = 0;
int mFloor_NEW = 0;
bool mRequest0_OLD = FALSE;
bool mRequest0_NEW = FALSE;
bool mRequest1_OLD = FALSE;
bool mRequest1_NEW = FALSE;
bool tRequest0_OLD = FALSE;
bool tRequest0_NEW = FALSE;
bool tRequest1_OLD = FALSE;
bool tRequest1_NEW = FALSE;int time_OLD = 0;
int time_NEW = 0;
byte Status_OLD = Idle0;
byte Status_NEW = Idle0;
/***********************/
/*    init function    */
/***********************/
init {
/********************************************************************/
    /*     update each variable that has no specified initial value
*/
/********************************************************************/
  /******************************/
  /*    main processing loop    */
  /******************************/
  do
  ::
    /*********************************************/
    /*     "any state" specification asserts     */
    /*********************************************/
/*********************************************************************/
    /*     update each variable and mode class for this state change
*/
/*********************************************************************/
    d_step { /* update in one "step" */
      _DUR_tRequest0_E_OLD = _DUR_tRequest0_E_NEW;
      _DUR_tRequest1_E_OLD = _DUR_tRequest1_E_NEW;
      mDoor_OLD = mDoor_NEW;
      mFloor_OLD = mFloor_NEW;
      mRequest0_OLD = mRequest0_NEW;
      mRequest1_OLD = mRequest1_NEW;
      tRequest0_OLD = tRequest0_NEW;
      tRequest1_OLD = tRequest1_NEW;
      time_OLD = time_NEW;
      Status_OLD = Status_NEW;
    } /* close state update d_step */
    /*********************************************/
    /*    simulate monitored variable changes    */
    /*********************************************/
    if
    ::if
      /* toggle the current value */
      :: (mRequest0_OLD) -> mRequest0_NEW = FALSE
      :: (!mRequest0_OLD) -> mRequest0_NEW = TRUE
      fi;
      d_step { /* print new value, no state effect */
        if        :: (mRequest0_NEW) -> printf("MVC mRequest0 TRUE\n")
        :: (!mRequest0_NEW) -> printf("MVC mRequest0 FALSE\n")
        fi
      }
    ::if
      /* toggle the current value */
      :: (mRequest1_OLD) -> mRequest1_NEW = FALSE
      :: (!mRequest1_OLD) -> mRequest1_NEW = TRUE
      fi;
      d_step { /* print new value, no state effect */
        if
        :: (mRequest1_NEW) -> printf("MVC mRequest1 TRUE\n")
        :: (!mRequest1_NEW) -> printf("MVC mRequest1 FALSE\n")
        fi
      }
    fi;
    if
      /* randomly jump to any value within the legal range of the
variable */
      :: ((time_OLD + 1) <= 1) -> time_NEW = time_OLD + 1
      :: ((time_OLD - 1) >= 0) -> time_NEW = time_OLD - 1
    fi;
    d_step { /* print new value, no state effect */
      printf("MVC time %d\n", time_NEW)
    }
    /***********************************************************/
    /*     executions of the functions in dependency order     */
    /***********************************************************/
    d_step { /* calculate in one "step" */
      /*Environment Assumption*/
      mDoor_NEW = cDoor_NEW;
      mFloor_NEW = cFloor_NEW;
      /* the PROMELA version of the tRequest0 function */
      if
      /* event: @T(mRequest0) WHEN (NOT(mFloor = 0 AND mDoor = OPEN) AND
                NOT(tRequest0 = True) ) */
      :: (mRequest0_NEW && (!mRequest0_OLD)) && ((!((mFloor_OLD == 0) &&
(mDoor_OLD == OPEN))) && (!(tRequest0_OLD == TRUE)))
             -> tRequest0_NEW = TRUE;
      /* event: @T(mFloor = 0 AND  mDoor = OPEN) */
      :: ((mFloor_NEW == 0) && (mDoor_NEW == OPEN)) && (!((mFloor_OLD ==
0) && (mDoor_OLD == OPEN)))
             -> tRequest0_NEW = FALSE;
      :: else skip;
      fi;
      /* the PROMELA version of the tRequest1 function */
      if
      /* event: @T(mRequest1) WHEN (NOT(mFloor = 1 AND mDoor = OPEN) AND
                NOT(tRequest1 = True) ) */      :: (mRequest1_NEW && (!mRequest1_OLD)) && ((!((mFloor_OLD == 1) &&
(mDoor_OLD == OPEN))) && (!(tRequest1_OLD == TRUE)))
             -> tRequest1_NEW = TRUE;
      /* event: @T( mFloor = 1 AND mDoor = OPEN) */
      :: ((mFloor_NEW == 1) && (mDoor_NEW == OPEN)) && (!((mFloor_OLD ==
1) && (mDoor_OLD == OPEN)))
             -> tRequest1_NEW = FALSE;
      :: else skip;
      fi;
      /* the PROMELA version of the _DUR_tRequest0_E function */
      if
      /* event: @F(tRequest0 = FALSE) */
      :: (tRequest0_OLD == FALSE) && (!(tRequest0_NEW == FALSE))
             -> _DUR_tRequest0_E_NEW = 0;
      /* event: @C(time)
                WHEN (tRequest0 = FALSE)
                AND (tRequest0 = FALSE)’ */
      :: ((!(time_NEW == time_OLD)) && (tRequest0_OLD == FALSE)) &&
(tRequest0_NEW == FALSE)
             -> _DUR_tRequest0_E_NEW = (_DUR_tRequest0_E_OLD + (time_NEW
- time_OLD));
      :: else skip;
      fi;
      /* the PROMELA version of the _DUR_tRequest1_E function */
      if
      /* event: @F(tRequest1 = FALSE) */
      :: (tRequest1_OLD == FALSE) && (!(tRequest1_NEW == FALSE))
             -> _DUR_tRequest1_E_NEW = 0;
      /* event: @C(time)
                WHEN (tRequest1 = FALSE)
                AND (tRequest1 = FALSE)’ */
      :: ((!(time_NEW == time_OLD)) && (tRequest1_OLD == FALSE)) &&
(tRequest1_NEW == FALSE)
             -> _DUR_tRequest1_E_NEW = (_DUR_tRequest1_E_OLD + (time_NEW
- time_OLD));
      :: else skip;
      fi;
      /* the PROMELA version of the Status function */
      if
      /* modes: Idle0 */
      /* event: @T(tRequest1) or @C( DURATION(tRequest0 = False) )
                WHEN (tRequest1 = True) */
      :: ((tRequest1_NEW && (!tRequest1_OLD)) ||
((!(_DUR_tRequest0_E_NEW == _DUR_tRequest0_E_OLD)) && (tRequest1_OLD ==
TRUE))) && (Status_OLD == Idle0)
             -> Status_NEW = EClose0;
      /* modes: EClose0 */
      /* event: @T(mDoor = CLOSE) */
      :: ((mDoor_NEW == CLOSE) && (!(mDoor_OLD == CLOSE))) &&
(Status_OLD == EClose0)
             -> Status_NEW = EMove0;
      /* modes: EMove0 */
      /* event: @T(mFloor = 1) */      :: ((mFloor_NEW == 1) && (!(mFloor_OLD == 1))) && (Status_OLD ==
EMove0)
             -> Status_NEW = EOpen0;
      /* modes: EOpen0 */
      /* event: @T(mDoor = OPEN) */
      :: ((mDoor_NEW == OPEN) && (!(mDoor_OLD == OPEN))) && (Status_OLD
== EOpen0)
             -> Status_NEW = Idle1;
      /* modes: Idle1 */
      /* event: @T(tRequest0) or @C( DURATION(tRequest1 = False) )
                WHEN (tRequest0 = True) */
      :: ((tRequest0_NEW && (!tRequest0_OLD)) ||
((!(_DUR_tRequest1_E_NEW == _DUR_tRequest1_E_OLD)) && (tRequest0_OLD ==
TRUE))) && (Status_OLD == Idle1)
             -> Status_NEW = EClose1;
      /* modes: EClose1 */
      /* event: @T(mDoor = CLOSE) */
      :: ((mDoor_NEW == CLOSE) && (!(mDoor_OLD == CLOSE))) &&
(Status_OLD == EClose1)
             -> Status_NEW = EMove1;
      /* modes: EMove1 */
      /* event: @T(mFloor = 0) */
      :: ((mFloor_NEW == 0) && (!(mFloor_OLD == 0))) && (Status_OLD ==
EMove1)
             -> Status_NEW = EOpen1;
      /* modes: EOpen1 */
      /* event: @T(mDoor = OPEN) */
      :: ((mDoor_NEW == OPEN) && (!(mDoor_OLD == OPEN))) && (Status_OLD
== EOpen1)
             -> Status_NEW = Idle0;
      :: else skip;
      fi;
      /* the PROMELA version of the cFloor function */
      if
      /* modes:     Idle0,EClose0,EMove1,EOpen1 */
      /* condition: True */
      :: ((((Status_NEW == EClose0) || (Status_NEW == EMove1)) ||
(Status_NEW == EOpen1)) || (Status_NEW == Idle0))
             -> cFloor_NEW = 0;
      /* modes:     EMove0,EOpen0,Idle1,EClose1 */
      /* condition: True */
      :: ((((Status_NEW == Idle1) || (Status_NEW == EClose1)) ||
(Status_NEW == EMove0)) || (Status_NEW == EOpen0))
             -> cFloor_NEW = 1;
      fi;
      /* the PROMELA version of the cDoor function */
      if
      /* modes:     Idle0,EOpen0,Idle1,EOpen1 */
      /* condition: True */
      :: ((((Status_NEW == Idle1) || (Status_NEW == EOpen1)) ||
(Status_NEW == Idle0)) || (Status_NEW == EOpen0))
             -> cDoor_NEW = OPEN;
      /* modes:     EClose0,EMove0,EClose1,EMove1 */
      /* condition: True */      :: ((((Status_NEW == EClose0) || (Status_NEW == EMove1)) ||
(Status_NEW == EClose1)) || (Status_NEW == EMove0))
             -> cDoor_NEW = CLOSE;
      fi;
    } /* close calculation d_step */
    /**************************************************/
    /*   "post-initial state" specification asserts   */
    /**************************************************/
    /* The assertion will make sure the elevator never moves with its
door open*/
    assert ((mFloor_OLD == 0 && mFloor_NEW == 1 && mDoor_OLD == CLOSE &&
mDoor_NEW == CLOSE) || (mFloor_OLD == 1 && mFloor_NEW == 0 && mDoor_OLD
== CLOSE && mDoor_NEW == CLOSE) || (mFloor_OLD == mFloor_NEW))
  od /* end of main processing loop */
}Property one and its result:
Property: If there is a request to a particular floor, the elevator will eventually service it.
(liveness)
Note: There are two tests. Part one test Floor zero request and part two test Floor one
request.
Part one specification and result:
#define p ( tRequest0_NEW == TRUE )
#define q ( mDoor_NEW == OPEN && mFloor_NEW == 0 )
/*
 * Formula As Typed: []  (p -> <>  q)
 * The Never Claim Below Corresponds
 * To The Negated Formula !([]  (p -> <>  q))
 * (formalizing violations of the original)
 */
warning: for p.o. reduction to be valid the never claim must be stutter-
closed
(never claims generated from LTL formulae are stutter-closed)
(Spin Version 3.3.3 -- 21 July 1999)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never-claim          +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
acceptance   cycles  + (fairness enabled)
invalid endstates - (disabled by never-claim)
State-vector 60 byte, depth reached 801, errors: 0
    2217 states, stored (3113 visited)
    1027 states, matched
    4140 transitions (= visited+matched)
       0 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 241 (resolved)
(max size 2^19 states)
2.644  memory usage (Mbyte)
unreached in proctype :init:
(0 of 118 states)
real        0.1
user        0.0
sys         0.0
#endifPart two specification and result:
#define p ( tRequest1_NEW == TRUE )
#define q ( mDoor_NEW == OPEN && mFloor_NEW == 1 )
/*
 * Formula As Typed: []  (p -> <>  q)
 * The Never Claim Below Corresponds
 * To The Negated Formula !([]  (p -> <>  q))
 * (formalizing violations of the original)
 */
warning: for p.o. reduction to be valid the never claim must be stutter-
closed
(never claims generated from LTL formulae are stutter-closed)
(Spin Version 3.3.3 -- 21 July 1999)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never-claim          +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
acceptance   cycles  + (fairness enabled)
invalid endstates - (disabled by never-claim)
State-vector 60 byte, depth reached 801, errors: 0
    2217 states, stored (3113 visited)
    1027 states, matched
    4140 transitions (= visited+matched)
       0 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 134 (resolved)
(max size 2^19 states)
2.644  memory usage (Mbyte)
unreached in proctype :init:
(0 of 118 states)
real        0.1
user        0.0
sys         0.0
#endifProperty two and its result:
Property: The elevator never moves with its doors open (safety)
Note:
A assert statement is added to check the property. It is added at the end of the while-do
loop to make sure each transition maintain the validity of the assertion. The assertion is
“mDoor_NEW  ==  CLOSE)  ||  (mFloor_OLD  ==  1  &&  mFloor_NEW  ==  0  &&
mDoor_OLD  ==  CLOSE  &&  mDoor_NEW  ==  CLOSE)  ||  (mFloor_OLD  ==
mFloor_NEW))”. The semantic of the assertion show as follow. If the elevator maintain
in the same floor, the status of the elevtor door is ignore. If the elevator change its floor,
the door has to be close.
Result:
warning: for p.o. reduction to be valid the never claim must be stutter-
closed
(never claims generated from LTL formulae are stutter-closed)
(Spin Version 3.4.3 -- 21 December 2000)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never-claim          +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
acceptance   cycles  + (fairness enabled)
invalid endstates - (disabled by never-claim)
State-vector 60 byte, depth reached 901, errors: 0
    2003 states, stored (3489 visited)
    1147 states, matched
    4636 transitions (= visited+matched)
       0 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 16 (resolved)
(max size 2^19 states)
2.644  memory usage (Mbyte)
unreached in proctype :init:
line 262, state 119, "-end-"
(22 of 119 states)
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